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Abstract. In this paper we present a real-life application of a fuzzy expert system aimed at rating 
and ranking firms. Unlike standard DCF models, it integrates financial, strategic and business 
determinants and processes both quantitative and qualitative variables. Twenty-one value drivers 
are defined, concerning the target firm (strategic assets in place and expected financial 
performance), the acquisition (synergies, quality of management) and the sector (intensity of 
competition, entry barriers). Their combination via “if-then” rules leads to the definition of an 
output represented by a real number in the interval [0,1]. Such a number expresses the value-
generating power of the target firm inclusive of synergies with the bidder (Strategic Enterprise 
Value). The system may be used for rating and ranking firms operating in the same sector. A 
regression analysis using hostile takeovers multiples may be employed to translate the score into 
price. The real-life case refers to Camuzzi (a natural gas distributor), acquired by Enel, the Italian 
ex monopolist of electric energy.  
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Introduction 
 
This paper presents an expert system aimed at evaluating firms. To this end, the lines of 
reasoning of experts are replicated taking into account financial, business, strategic determinants. 
The approach followed results in a method of rating and ranking firms. The model presented may 
also be used to inform about the impact of a particular management’s decision on value creation or 
to compensate managers on the basis of their performance. The model has been applied to the case 
of Camuzzi, recently acquired by Enel, the Italian ex monopolist of electric energy. 
The evaluation derives from the use of “if-then” rules in a fuzzy-logic environment. While 
our approach is just a first attempt to develop a new methodology for appraising firms and business 
units, we think that this path is fruitful for dealing with complex situations where a great number of 
value drivers must be taken into account, both qualitative and quantitative, and/or where explicit 
account of their interrelations must be taken for a better description of the evaluation process. 
 
 While alternative to discounted-cash-flow (DCF) techniques, the structure of the model we 
propose is logically consistent with them as well as with a strategic management conceptual 
framework. As for DCF techniques, the standard computation of the enterprise value is given by the 
present value of the free cash flows to firm (FCFF): 
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where )1(FCFFFCFF 1 gtt += − , 1FCFF:FCFF = , g=growth rate, WACC=Weighted Average Cost of 
Capital. The WACC is an opportunity cost, representing the foregone return of alternatives 
businesses in the same class of risk (usually in the same sector), and is an increasing function of 
risk. The value is also increasing with respect to both FCFF and g, and it is decreasing with respect 
to risk. An equivalent way of computing the market value of the firm is the APV method introduced 
by Myers (1974) (see Fernández, 2002): 
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where Uk =cost of equity of the unleveraged company, DVTS=Discounted Value of Tax Shield. 
Consistently with this approach, the output of our expert system depends on free cash flows and 
growth (positive correlation), as well as on operating risk (negative correlation). 
 Unfortunately, the DCF methods are black boxes where the determinants of FCF and g are 
not highlighted and where risk appears only implicitly in the rate Uk  (or WACC), whereas our 
model explicitly takes account of these variables. Further, the DCF methodology seems to be 
unsuited for quantification of synergies and, if a quantification is ever attempted, the analyst just 
raises discretionally the FCF. In our approach, we explicitly consider synergies as an important 
determinant of rating, and explicit relations between synergies’ determinants are stated via a 
specific rule block (see next section).  
In other terms, the rigorous way of discounting cash flows adopted by the DCF approach is 
offset by a nontransparent way of fixing the value for FCFF, g and the rates Uk  or WACC. The 
determination of these inputs is left to the analyst’s or managers’ arbitrariness, so causing possible 
manipulations of data. Our model does retain the conceptual frame of the DCF approach, but 
integrates it with strategic management theories. For example, the presence of Resources and Skills 
as a value driver is coherent with the findings of the Resource-based view according to which a 
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variety of peculiar skills and intangible abilities can greatly affect a firm’s performance (Barney, 
1986, 1991, 2001; Grant, 1991; Levinthal, 1995). Likewise, the variables Barriers, Customer 
Concentration and Supplier Concentration give expression to Porter’s (1980, 1985) industry 
analysis. 
The integrated view we propose is also consistent with bounded rationality in that pre-
eminent importance is given to recognizing limited computational capabilities and presence of 
constraints. For example, the presence in our model of the value driver Management Quality is 
consistent with the literature on Top Management Teams (TMTs) which claims that managers and 
employees differ in expertise so that the quality of the TMT’s decisions substantially influence the 
performance of the firm (Bromiley, 2005, p. 78. See also Simons, Pelled and Smith, 1999). 
Likewise, the presence of the variable Technology conforms to the finding of most studies of 
organizational learning according to which owning a specific technology is valuable because 
transferring technologies is difficult and takes time even in the same sector (Bromiley, 2005, p. 84). 
In addition, the very formal structure of our model is consistent with a behavioral 
perspective in strategic management: By creating nontrivial connections among variables and 
expressing relationships via ‘if-then’ implications we try to give formal clothing to the idea that a 
firm is a complex system made of physical, intellectual and financial assets, knowledge and skills of 
management and employees, which is grounded on complex interrelations (see Bromiley, 2005, for 
relationships among bounded rationality, Resource-based view, Porter’s industry analysis, and for a 
behavioral foundation of strategic management). 
 
The system processes absolute as well as relative variables. The former are defined relative to the 
sector in which the firm operates (e.g., Operating Leverage and ROI), the latter are firm-specific 
and do not relate to the other firms in the sector (e.g., Management, Resources and Skills). The 
rating is then a mix of absolute/relative indexes and should be interpreted in connection with the 
purposes for which it is used.  
 
The final output is a rating in [0,1], and serves several uses: 
  
(a) Ranking firms in the same sector.  All the firms of a sector are rated with the expert system, 
and then ranked according to groups expressing their value-generating power. 
(b) Comparing business units of a firm. The business units of a firm are compared through the 
relative rating. 
(c) Measuring the impact of the firm’s possible policies and strategies on value creation. For 
each different policy a rating of the firm is provided and the decision is taken following the 
highest rating.  
(d) Evaluating the impact of particular decisions on value creation. The firm is first rated 
assuming a particular alternative is undertaken, and then it is rated assuming that alternative is 
rejected. The decision will be taken which corresponds to the higher score. 
(e) Rewarding and compensating managers. The firm or business unit is rated at the beginning 
and at the end of a period to compute the increase/decrease in the value-generating power and 
therefore assess the managers’ performance. 
(f) Pricing firms. The rating may be translated into price through a statistical procedure, in case an 
acquisition is under consideration (see section 5). 
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1. The expert system 
 
 An expert system is a software addressed to achievements usually performed by a human 
expert. It consists of a knowledge base and an inferential engine. If a question is asked, the system 
will try to infer the answer from the knowledge base, using logic and the heuristics of the inferential 
engine. The knowledge must be represented in symbolic forms so as to be stocked and used by a 
computer. The most common method to this end is to use rule blocks. For example, a simple rule 
based on conditional (“if-then”) implications is the following: 
 
   IF market forecasts are favorable 
   AND (the quality of the products is very high  
OR the intensity of rivalry is low), 
   THEN prospective profits are high. 
 
Linguistic attributes such as “favorable” “high”, “very high”, “low” and such are given a fuzzy 
quantification through the construction of fuzzy numbers. Figure 1 shows the fuzzy number of the 
variable Reinvestment Rate. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Reinvestment Rate 
 
The x-axis collects all possible numerical values for the Reinvestment Rate, whose unit of measure 
is given by  
 
rate)tax EBIT(1
capital ngcash workinon   on depreciati  esexpenditurcapital
−
∆+−  
 
(see section 6 for a detailed description of every input and every intermediate variable). The y-axis 
collects the degrees at which a linguistic attribute is activated (membership degrees). The very-low 
attribute is represented by a trapezium (its basis ranges from 0 to 1.2) and the others linguistic 
attributes (low, medium-low, medium-high, high, very-high) are depicted as triangles (their bases 
range, respectively, from 0.9 to 1.5, from 1.2 to 2.15, from 2.15 to 3.05, from 2.6 to 3.05). For 
example, if the evaluator fixes a reinvestment rate of 1, this means that it is considered very-low at a 
degree of 0.75 and low at a degree of 0.25. If instead the reinvestment rate is fixed at 2.8, then it is 
considered high at a degree of 0.55 and very-high at a degree of 0.45.2 
                                                 
2 The sum of the membership degrees need not be 1 (they are not probability measures); it just depends on the shape of 
the fuzzy number the evaluator chooses for describing the linguistic attributes. 
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Each linguistic attribute of each value driver is described by a fuzzy number. The shape of the fuzzy 
number (triangle, trapezium, or other regular or irregular geometric figures) and the number of 
linguistic attributes is left to the subjectivity of the expert constructing the model.  
 As for the qualitative value drivers (such as Entry Barriers and Management Quality), the x-
axis is normalized to the interval [0,1] and the determination of the appropriate value should be left 
to the judgment of the evaluator, whose specific experience in the field and fairness are necessary 
conditions for a correct attribution.3 For example, in the Camuzzi case we have decided to activate 
the variable Management Quality at a degree of 0.8. The reason is to be found in the good track 
record of the incumbent target’s management team (under the assumption of no substitution). We 
have abstained from giving the maximum score of 1 because of a lack of international experience of 
its management team (excepting the Argentine market). In view of the global context in which the 
new company will have to operate we have therefore considered the presumable lack of wide 
international experience as a minus. 
As for the quantitative value drivers a more articulated procedure has been employed: a peer 
group of companies, belonging to the same industrial sector and possibly operating on the same 
markets, have been isolated (we have used financial data of some of the biggest Italian utilities 
firms: Acea, Acsm, Hera, Meta, Agea, Acegas-Aps, Agac, Amps, Tesa Piacenza, Aem Torino, 
Amga, Aem, Asm, Bas Bergamo, Snam, Enel) and, for each such variable, the value in each 
company has been determined.4 The ranges of the linguistic attributes of all the quantitative drivers 
in the model can be easily defined through a statistical computation of the distribution of values 
around industry’s median values. As an example, consider the variable ROI, which is a determinant 
(alongside Reinvestment Rate) of the intermediate variable Growth Rate (see Diagram at the end of 
the paper). Table 1 shows the statistical distribution of this variable in the sample of selected 
utilities. The interval of variation we have found is 0-14%. Dealing with sextiles we have 
consistently considered six linguistic attributes: very-low, low, medium-low, medium-high, high, 
very-high (the resulting fuzzy numbers are represented in Figure 2). We have then fixed 5.1% as the 
ROI of Camuzzi, which represents the pre-acquisition value of the ROI (see section 2).  Looking at 
Figure 2, we see that the ROI of Camuzzi is very low at a degree of 1.  
 
                                 
Table 1. Utilities sector: ROI distribution 
 
 ROI 
Sextile 1 5.5% 
Sextile 2 8.4% 
Sextile 3 9.1% 
Sextile 4 9.8% 
Sextile 5 10.1% 
Sextile 6 13.2% 
Camuzzi’s value 5.1% 
Variation’s interval (0-14%) 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 The presence of subjective judgments is not a drawback but a strength of the model. The system is just aimed at 
replicating the very line of reasoning of an expert or a panel of experts. 
4 To this end, financial databases can be used (e.g. Bloomberg, Barra, Datastream for listed companies, Aida for private 
ones). We have used Bloomberg. 
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Once decided which inputs are to be used as value drivers, once constructed the corresponding 
fuzzy numbers, once fixed the appropriate value in the x-axis for each value, such a value is 
fuzzified with the fuzzy numbers and a modular approach is triggered, according to which the 
twenty-one value drivers are combined into groups to create intermediate variables via the 
activation of rule blocks. The intermediate variables in turn aggregate to give rise to other 
intermediate variables via other rule blocks, and so on until two intermediate outputs are reached: 
Enterprise Value (see Diagram at the end of the paper) and Synergies. The latter two are in turn 
combined to obtain the final output. This output, being itself represented by a fuzzy number, is 
automatically defuzzified by the system providing a ‘crisp’ value in the interval [0,1] (for details on 
the functioning of the system and the defuzzification procedure, see von Altrock, 1997).5 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. ROI 
 
The final output of our model represents the value-creation power of the firm and is here called 
Strategic Enterprise Value. As anticipated, it consists of two fundamental blocks: 
 
(1) Camuzzi’s Enterprise Value 
(2) Synergies realizable through the merger between Enel and Camuzzi. 
 
The Strategic Enterprise Value of the target is then a function of Enterprise Value and Synergies 
(see Figure 3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Strategic Enterprise Value as a function of Enterprise Value and Synergies 
                                                 
5 The expert system may also be read backward, with the output being interpreted as a function of intermediate 
variables, each of which is in turn function of intermediate variables, and so backward until the input variables (the 
value drivers) are reached 
Strategic Enterprise Value 
Enterprise Value 
Synergies 
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The way the Strategic Enterprise Value is obtained from these two variables is given by the rule 
block represented in Table 2.  
The intermediate output Synergies depends on three variables: Complementarities, Economies of 
Scale, and Market Share (see section 6 for description of these inputs). 
 
 
 
Table 2. Strategic Enterprise Value rule-block 
 
IF THEN 
Enterprise Value Synergies Strategic Enterprise Value 
Very_low Very_low Very_low 
Very_low Low Low 
Very_low Medium Low 
Very_low High medium_low 
Very_low Very_high medium_low 
Low Very_low Low 
Low Low Medium_low 
Low Medium Medium_low 
Low High Medium 
Low Very_high Medium 
Medium Very_low Medium_low 
Medium Low Medium 
Medium Medium Medium 
Medium High Medium 
Medium Very _high Medium_high 
High Very _low Medium 
High Low Medium 
High Medium Medium_high 
High High Medium_high 
High Very _high High 
Very_high Very _low Medium_high 
Very_high Low Medium_high 
Very_high Medium High 
Very_high High High 
Very_high Very _high Very _high 
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Figure 4. Synergies as a function of Complementarities, Economies of Scale and Market Share 
 
 
The intermediate output Enterprise Value is instead a function of Free Cash Flow to Firm, Growth 
Rate and Operating Risk. Each of the latter are in turn function of other variables, as the Diagram at 
the end of the paper shows. All intermediate variables are reached via “if-then” rule blocks, 
analogously to the one described in Table 2. 
 
  
2. Notions of value 
 
There are various possible meaning attachable to the term “value”. We focus on the 
following: 
 
Stand-alone Value. It is the value of a firm considered standing-alone, without 
consideration of possible synergies (nor other interrelations with the buyer). 
Status-quo Value.  It is the value of a firm with no consideration of possible additional 
value from the bidder’s potential through a managerial optimization (i.e. no management change, no 
increased efficiency in operating working capital investment etc.). 
Optimal Value. If we add to the Status-Quo Value the potential value attainable through a 
managerial optimization then we obtain an Optimal Value which is expression of a different and 
better management team. In the corporate finance literature the difference between the two values is 
labelled value of management change or expected value of control: 6 
 
EXPECTED VALUE OF CONTROL= Optimal Value – Status-Quo Value. 
 
Control premiums are usually paid for controlling companies. From the point of view of 
shareholders the control premium paid should be smaller or equal to the value of control. If the 
target company is already optimally managed no control premium should be paid.  
 
Strategic Value. It is the value of the firm inclusive of the value of Synergies. 
 
                                                 
6 “The value of controlling a firm has to lie in being able to run it differently (and better). Consequently, the value of 
control will be greater for poorly managed firms than well run ones” (Damodaran, 2005, p. 60). “If we estimate a value 
for the firm, assuming that existing management practices continue, and call this a status quo value and re-estimate the 
value of the same firm, assuming that it is optimally managed, and call this estimate the optimal value, the value of 
changing management can be written as: Value of management change = optimal firm value – status quo value” 
(Damodaran, 2005, p.16). 
Synergies 
Complementarities 
Economies of Scale 
Market Share 
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Core-Business Value. It is the value of the company excluding cash, marketable securities, 
real estate, secondary businesses (e.g. Piacenza Calcio for Camuzzi) and non operating assets, 
which must be considered separately. The notion of free cash flow to firm we employ does not 
include earnings on secondary assets and interests on securities. 
Unlevered Value. The value of the firm as if there were no debt, as opposed to the levered 
enterprise value, where capital structure is taken into account. 
 
The notion of Enterprise Value employed for Camuzzi is: Stand-alone, Status-quo, Core-business, 
Unlevered (SSCU). 
 
Therefore, we have assumed no substitution of management after the purchase of Camuzzi by Enel. 
The control premium has consequently been neglected. This means that we have fixed the inputs of 
the system taking into consideration the current performance, not the best possible one attainable 
with an optimal management. A relative stability with the past has also been postulated. As an 
unlevered stand-alone status-quo and core business value, Camuzzi’s Enterprise Value represents 
the minimum fair value attributable to Camuzzi, with no consideration of capital structure (and 
therefore before computation of the tax shield). If a price is extracted from this value (see section 5) 
one obtains the lowest price payable to acquire the business (floor price) with no consideration of 
the tax shield’s value.  
 
Although we have not considered the additional value from managerial optimization7 this can be 
easily included in the system. One just has to change those input variables that directly (e.g. 
Management Quality) or indirectly (e.g. Expenditures in R&D, NonCash Working Capital) affect 
the expected value of control. With the new inputs corresponding to optimized management a new 
Enterprise Value is obtained by the system, whose meaning will be Stand-Alone, Optimal, Core-
business, Unlevered (SOCU). This SOCU Value is therefore an expression of the best possible 
exploitation of the firm’s assets’ in a given competitive context. In terms of operating actions, the 
managerial optimization should lead to increasing cash flows from assets in place (e.g. improving 
operating efficiency, asset redeployment, reducing working capital investment), increasing the 
expected growth or lengthen the high growth period, and reducing the operating risk by working on 
the manoeuvrable risk components (e.g. reducing operating leverage and/or the product/services 
discretionary through marketing investments). If transformed in a price,  this optimal value provides 
the highest price payable to acquire the operating assets of the target (ceiling price). 
 
As seen in section 1, the Enterprise Value and the value of Synergies have been aggregated to create 
what we call the Strategic Enterprise Value. If one adds the expected value of control and the value 
of tax shield, alongside marketable securities and non-operating assets, one finds the Firm Value of 
the target (Table 3). 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 The reason is not only due to a lack of information, but also to the fact that a status-quo value is highly informative, 
because it  furnishes a minimum threshold for a firm.  
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Table 3. Strategic Enterprise Value 
 
  
 SSCU Enterprise Value 
+ Synergies 
 
 Strategic Enterprise Value 
+ Expected Value of Control 
 
 Strategic Enterprise Value (Optimal) 
+ Value of Tax Shield 
+ Cash and marketable securities 
+ Holdings and other non-operating assets 
 
 Firm Value 
  
 
 
 SSCU Enterprise Value 
+ Expected Value of Control 
 
 SOCU Enterprise Value 
+ Synergies 
 
 Strategic Enterprise Value (Optimal) 
+ Value of Tax Shield 
+ Cash and marketable securities 
+ Holdings and other non-operating assets 
 
 Firm Value 
 
 
 
    
  
As shown in the left column of Figure 3, we have not considered the Expected Value of Control nor 
the value of tax shield. As seen, the former may be taken account by the expert system by changing 
the value of the inputs related to management performance, whereas the value of the latter may be 
considered by constructing an expert system whose output is integrated (via a rule block) with both 
Enterprise Value and Synergies (see Figure 5).8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Strategic Enterprise Value (Optimal) 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 An example of evaluation of a levered firm with a fuzzy expert system can be found in Magni, Malagoli and 
Mastroleo (2006). 
Strategic Enterprise Value (Optimal) 
SOCU Enterprise Value
Synergies (see Figure 4) 
Expected Value of 
Control 
SSCU Enterprise 
Value 
 (see Table at the end of 
the paper) 
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3. The results 
 
To obtain the Strategic Enterprise Value, we have fixed a value for each of the twenty-one 
value drivers described in section 6.1, excepting three of them: Acquisition, Competitive Rivalry, 
Economies of Scale. The latter have been given two different values, so obtaining two different 
scenarios (see Table 4). This choice is due to our incomplete information about (a) the evolution of 
the sector’s boundaries and competition in the future, (b) the managerial actions following the bid, 
(c) data on scale economies. 
As for Acquisition, the recent liberalization of the utilities sector in many European countries 
has led us to predict an elevated flow of acquisitions in the future. Being Camuzzi an important 
player on the Italian and European market, it is highly probable that it will be particularly active on 
acquisitions in the future. We have consequently attributed a value of 0.7 in the first scenario and of 
0.85 in the second scenario. The higher value is evidently associated with a smaller score for the 
Free Cash Flow to Firm  in the second scenario (0.44) than in the first one (0.5). The reverse occurs 
to the Reinvestment Needs, which rise from 0.13 to 0.23. 
As for Competitive Rivalry, in the European utility sector it is not easy to predict the intensity of 
competition which will characterize the market in the future, but it is plausible that it will not be 
low because of a persistent attractiveness of the business (rich cash generation and relatively low 
risk profile), which will probably attract new comers or lead incumbents to contending new 
markets. This justifies our assumptions of 0.8 and 0.5 respectively. The higher score attributed in 
the first scenario explains the higher Business Risk and the higher Operating Risk value in the first 
scenario. 
As for the variable Economies of Scale, in the first scenario we have fixed a rather high value of 
0.8 (good potential opportunity to share SG&A costs), while in the second we have fixed a medium 
value of 0.5, which in our view is the most plausible assessment due to the restrictions of the Italian 
labour law on dismissing. 
 
It is worth noting that the value of Synergies in the second scenario decreases from 0.79 to 0.65 due 
to the decrease in Economies of Scale. Camuzzi’s Enterprise Value decreases from scenario 1 to 
scenario 2, but the decrement is negligible: the lower expected FCFF due to the higher Reinvestment 
Needs is almost entirely offset by the lower Operating Risk, due to a lower Business Risk,  which 
induces a lower.  
 
The two final ratings for Camuzzi’s Strategic Enterprise Value (0.57 in the first scenario, 0.45 in 
the second one) can be considered as the lower and upper limit of a fork of values for the potential 
buyer (Enel). Being the final output normalized at [0,1] the results show that Camuzzi’s acquisition, 
in a status-quo valuation’s perspective, has a medium value-creation power for Enel. If one were to 
add the value of control one would reach a higher score. i.e. a higher value-creation power, which, 
if commuted into price, would lead to the highest price payable by Enel for Camuzzi (prior to 
consideration of tax shield, marketable securities and non-operating assets).  
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Table 4. The input variables (value drivers) for Camuzzi 
 
Inputs (value drivers) Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Acquisition 0.7 0.85 
Capital Expenditures in R&D  0.02 0.02 
Competitive Rivalry 0.8 0.5 
Complementarities 0.85 0.85 
Consumer Price Sensitivity  0.65 0.65 
Customer Concentration  0.1 0.1 
Economies of Scale 0.8 0.5 
Entry Barriers 0.9 0.9 
Investment in NonCash Working Capital −0.05 −0.05 
Management Quality 0.8 0.8 
Market Share  0.8 0.8 
Net Capital Expenditure 0.02 0.02 
Operating Leverage 0.07 0.07 
Processes Efficiency 0.9 0.9 
Reinvestment Needs 2.17 2.17 
Resources and Skills 0.9 0.9 
ROI 0.05 0.05 
Sensitivity to Macroeconomic Variables  0.65 0.65 
Supplier Concentration 0.9 0.9 
Tax Rate 0.33 0.33 
Technology 0.9 0.9 
 
 
Table 5. The intermediate variables for Camuzzi 
 
Intermediate Variables Scenario  1 Scenario 2 
Bargaining Power  0.5 0.5 
Business Risk 0.75 0.5 
FCFF  0.5 0.44 
Growth Rate 0.25 0.25 
Operating Costs 0.07 0.07 
Operating Margin 0.63 0.63 
Operating Risk 0.46 0.33 
Product Quality 0.9 0.9 
Reinvestment Needs 0.13 0.23 
Revenues 0.6 0.6 
Specific Risk 0.36 0.36 
Strategic Risk 0.08 0.08 
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Table 6. Camuzzi’s Enterprise Value, Synergies and Strategic Enterprise Value 
 
 Scenario  1 Scenario 2 
Enterprise Value  0.47 0.44 
Synergies 0.79 0.65 
Strategic Enterprise 
Value 
0.57 0.45 
 
 
Table 7. Enterprise Value. Ranking of firms in sector X 
 
Company (defuzzified) Enterprise 
Value 
Valuation 
Company 1 1.00 
Company 2 0.95 
 
M  
 
 
M  
 
Company n1 0.80 
High 
Company n1+1 0.73 
Company n1+2 0.66 
 
M  
 
 
M  
 
Company n1+ n2 0.60 
Medium High 
Company n1+ n2+1 0.58 
Company n1+ n2+2 0.49 
 
M  
 
 
M  
Company n1+ n2+ n3 0.40 
Medium Low 
Company n1+ n2+ n3+1 0.32 
Company n1+ n2+ n3+2 0.28 
 
M  
 
 
M  
Company n 0.00 
Low 
 
   This expert system is especially useful if one thinks of his application to all firms operating in the 
same sector. One may obtain normalized scores for the Enterprise Value of each firm of a particular 
sector which may be made publicly available to operators in the market and potential buyers. As an 
example, one may stipulate that firms in the interval [0-0.2) have a low value-creation power, firms 
in the interval [0.2-0.4) have a medium-low value-creation power, firms in the interval [0.4, 0.6) 
have a medium-high value-creation power and the interval [0.8-1] represents a high value-creation 
power. A ranking  is then established among firms, analogously to a ranking of companies’ bonds 
in different risk classes. If there are n firms in sector X, they will be divided in four groups, each of 
which includes n1,  n2,  n3,  n4  firms respectively. Once fixed the 18n inputs, the expert system 
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computes the appropriate score for each firm, which will be inserted in the corresponding group 
(see Table 7).9 
 
 
4. Sensitivity analysis: the relative weight of Enterprise Value and Synergies 
 
Any model needs corroboration. To this end, we have tested its reliability through a series of 
simulations by modifying the value of one or more inputs simultaneously, while leaving the other 
fixed. The greater the number of simulations, the higher the degree of corroboration of the model. A 
sensitivity analysis has the objective to test if the final output and the intermediate variables react in 
a correct way to the changes of one or more input variables. The reaction has to be “correct” in 
terms of both correlation and magnitude (the magnitude of the reaction is particularly important for 
firm valuation). For reasons of space, only three simulations are described in this section10 aimed at 
understanding the role of the two intermediate outputs in determining the final output and, from this 
point of view, test the robustness of the model.  
The first simulation shows different values of the Strategic Enterprise Value for different 
values of the three determinants of Synergies (Economies of Scale, Complementarities and Market 
Share). The other inputs are set as in scenario 1, whereas the three determinants of Synergies are 
raised from the lowest value of 0 to the highest value of 1. Table 8 shows the value drivers’ 
variation in the eleven different cases considered. Looking at Table 9 one may appreciate the 
corresponding modifications of Enterprise Value, Synergies and the final output. As one can see, 
there is no variation in Enterprise Value (which is obvious, given that the three inputs considered 
are not conceptually or formally related to Enterprise Value), which keeps at 0.47. The value of 
Synergies rises progressively from 0 to 1, as one should expect, given that the three factors describe 
the worst possible situation in case 1 and the best possible situation in case 11. Correspondingly, 
Strategic Enterprise Value increases from 0.31 (case 1) to 0.64 (case 11) (case 9 just corresponds to 
scenario 1 in Tables 4-6). 
 
Table 8. Changing the determinants of Synergies 
 
CASE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Complementarities 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
Economies of Scale 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
Market Share  0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
 
Table 9. Changes in the outputs 
 
CASE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Enterprise Value 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47
Synergies 0.00 0.12 0.21 0.29 0.38 0.50 0.62 0.71 0.79 0.88 1.00
Strategic Enterprise 
Value 
0.31 0.34 0.37 0.40 0.43 0.48 0.51 0.54 0.57 0.60 0.64
                                                 
9 Evidently, ranking system regards the Enterprise Value, not the Strategic Enterprise Value, because Synergies varies 
depending on whom is the buyer. Therefore, the inputs are 18 for each firm. 
10 Other simulations of a different version of the model can be found in Magni, Malagoli and Mastroleo (2006), 
Malagoli, Magni and Mastroleo (2007). 
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Figure 6 
 
The first simulation confirms that the value of Synergies is an important element of valuation, 
capable of raising the final score from a medium-low value to a medium-high value. That the value 
of Camuzzi’s Strategic Enterprise Value cannot be higher should be understood: Enterprise Value 
is not high enough to provide a higher final output. Figure 6 is a graphical illustration of the 
simulation.   
 
To further understand the role of Enterprise Value and Synergies, we have varied the determinants 
of Synergies from 0 to 1 in two different extreme hypoteheses: (a) best possible score for each 
determinants of Enterprise Value (which takes on the maximum value of 1) (b) worst possible score 
for each determinant of Enterprise Value (which takes on the minimum value of 0).  
 
Tables 10-11 show the result of these two simulations.  
 
 
Table 10. Changing the determinants of Synergies with a maximum Enterprise Value  
 
CASE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Enterprise Value 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Synergies 0.00 0.12 0.21 0.29 0.38 0.50 0.62 0.71 0.79 0.88 1.00
Strategic Enterprise 
Value 0.67 0.70 0.73 0.77 0.80 0.83 0.87 0.90 0.93 0.97 1 
 
 
 16
Table 11. Changing the determinants of Synergies with a minimum Enterprise Value  
 
CASE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Enterprise Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Synergies 0.00 0.12 0.21 0.29 0.38 0.50 0.62 0.71 0.79 0.88 1.00
Strategic Enterprise 
Value 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.20 0.23 0.27 0.30 0.33
 
It is worth noting that in all the three simulations Synergies affects the Strategic Enterprise Value 
by 0.33: in the first simulation the output shifts from 0.31 to 0.64, in the second simulation it rises 
from 0.67 to 1, in the third simulation it increases from 0 to 0.33. 
 
This means that, given a determined score for Enterprise Value, Synergies is capable of increasing 
(decreasing) the Strategic Enterprise Value by 0.33. This informs about the relative weight of 
Synergies with respect to the final output, but also suggests a test for the robustness of the model: if 
the expert system is robust, then we expect that, given a relative weight of Synergies of 0.33, the 
relative weight of Enterprise Value should amount to about 0.67 (=1−0.33). This is actually what 
the system provides: given a determined score for Synergies, the Enterprise Value is capable of 
increasing (decreasing) the Strategic Enterprise Value by 0.67. To verify it, we just have to fix a 
value of Synergies and see how the final output reacts if Enterprise Value is increased. Just 
rearranging Tables 9-11 we obtain a result that confirms robustness (Table 12 reports some 
examples extracted from the eleven cases): increases is 0.67. 
 
Table 12. Changes in the Enterprise Value 
 
CASE 1 2 3 Increases 
Enterprise Value 0.00 0.47 1.00  
     
Synergies 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Strategic Enterprise 
Value 0.00 0.31 0.67 0.67 
     
Synergies 0.29 0.29 0.29  
Strategic Enterprise 
Value 0.10 0.4 0.77 0.67 
     
Synergies 0.50 0.50 0.50  
Strategic Enterprise 
Value 0.17 0.48 0.84 0.67 
     
Synergies 0.71 0.71 0.71  
Strategic Enterprise 
Value 0.23 0.54 0.90 0.67 
     
Synergies 1.00 1.00 1.00  
Strategic Enterprise 
Value 0.33 0.64 1.00 0.67 
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5. Pricing 
 
If a potential buyer intends to acquire the firm and needs to know the price at which the firm 
should be acquired, it is possible to convert the scoring provided by the expert system into a price. 
One of the possible methods to extract a price is to make use of regression analysis. As seen, the 
expert system we have constructed for this application is conceptually and technically divided into 
two main blocks: Enterprise Value and Synergies. It is then possible to price each block separately 
and then sum the two shares to obtain the price a strategic investor should pay for acquiring the 
assets of the target firm.  
 
In general, the process should be composed by the following steps: 
 
(1) Choose a subclass of firms (at least two) in the market which are regarded as fairly 
priced. Data should be collected on an efficient financial market (e.g. NYSE)  
(2) For each of the chosen firms isolate the value drivers that actively affect Enterprise 
Value. They are: Tax Rate, Competitive Rivalry, Sensitivity to Macroeconomic Factors, 
Operating Leverage, Consumer Price Sensitivity, Quality of Management, Reinvestment 
Rate, ROI, Acquisitions, Net Capital Expenditures, Investment in Non-Cash Working 
Capital, Entry Barriers, Processes Efficiency, Customer Concentration, Supplier 
Concentration, Capital Expenditures in R&D, Resources and Skills and Technology. Fix 
the correct values for the firms at hand and compute, via expert system, the defuzzified 
Enterprise Value for each of these firms 
(3) Associate to each Enterprise Value so obtained its Enterprise Value/Ebitda ratio and plot 
the pairs (x,y) on an xy-plane, where x is the (defuzzified) Enterprise Value provided by 
the system and y is the EV/Ebitda ratio of the firm 
(4) Run a (linear or quadratic) regression to infer the function y=f(x) connecting Enterprise 
Value and the EV/Ebitda ratio 
(5) Consider the target firm, compute its (defuzzified) Enterprise Value and put it in the 
analytic expression of the function as the independent variable, so as to obtain the 
EV/Ebitda ratio and therefore the market value of the firm. 
 
The crucial factor of this procedure concerns the choice of the subclass of firms. Two assumptions 
have to be satisfied: 
 
(a) fairly priced firms possibly belonging to the peer group of the target should be selected 
(b) there must be a correspondence between the market enterprise value of the selected 
firms (and so their EV/Ebitda ratios) and the score computed by the system: they should 
express the same value notion (see section 2). 
 
Condition (b) implies that if the target company’s Enterprise Value provided by the system is a 
Stand-Alone Optimal Value, then the stock price of the firms selected for the regression should 
already include the Expected Value of Control. 
If the firm is under consideration by a strategic investor willing to realize synergies, the 
same statistical procedure should be applied for determining the premium to be paid for the 
Synergies. In this case the synergy premium may be computed considering the market value of 
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equity of some selected firms before and after acquisition. Adding the market value of synergies to 
the market firm one finds the market Strategic Enterprise Value.11  
 
The problem is that it is not easy to ascertain whether and when the stock price includes (i) 
the value of control, (ii) the value of synergies (iii) both the value of control and the value of 
synergies, (iv) neither the value of control nor the value of synergies, (v) the value of control, the 
value of synergies, and an overpayment. Hostile takeovers represent a good example of the 
importance of control premiums, since the “hostility” of the operation often stands in the will of the 
buyer to replace the target firm’s management team to grasp the hidden value. It is therefore 
necessary to find empirical evidence supportive of the fact that hostile takeovers are fundamentally 
motivated by control. A first distinction has to be made between hostile takeovers led by strategic 
investors who intend to generate synergies and hostile takeovers where the target firm remains 
independent after the deal, or acquisitions conducted by individual investors or acquiring entities 
that can’t generate synergies (e.g. private equity funds, pension funds). One may state that when the 
buyer is not a “synergy hunter” the rationale of the operation is control and the premium paid is 
only a control premium (eliminating the cases of overpayment). Damodaran cites some scientific 
studies supportive of the evidence of a large perceived benefit from control in hostile acquisitions, 
positively seen by the market (Lang, Stultz, and Walkling, 1989). There are also empirical 
evidences consistent with the assumptions that the existence itself of a market for corporate control 
lies in the target firms characteristics (low operating performances and stock price performance) 
and that relevant managerial changes follow hostile takeovers (Bhide, 1989).   
 
  
Table 13. Bidders and motives   
 
 Control Synergies 
Financial Investors through 
MBO and MBI (Private 
Equity Funds, individual 
investors) 
Yes (if majority owners) Not often 
Strategic Investors (friendly 
acquisitions) 
Should not be paid if no managerial 
change follows the bid Yes 
Strategic Investors (hostile 
takeovers) Yes Yes (often) 
 
 
 
Assuming that the regression regards the Enterprise Value intended as a Stand-Alone Optimal 
Value, to satisfy condition (b) above one should select firms that: 
  
(i) belong to the peer group of the target company. The number of observations should be 
sufficiently wide to act as a significant statistical sample 
                                                 
11 An alternative procedure is that of running a regression connecting directly the Strategic Enterprise Value computed 
by the system and the EV/Ebitda market multiple. In this case the stock price of the selected firms should incorporate 
not only a control premium, but also a synergy premium. 
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(ii) have been object of a hostile acquisition. Market data after the acquisition should be 
used, but values before acquisition may also be employed in a context where stock 
prices tend to reflect the expected value of control (high likelihood of management 
change); 
(iii) have not been acquired for creating synergies, so that the premium paid is entirely 
attributable to the value of control (the target firm remains independent after the deal). 
 
One should reject firms whose: 
 
(iv) market value may reflect an overpayment; 
(v) expected value of control is partly attributable to excess cash balances (short term 
investments below market rates or management misuse of the excess liquidity), or to 
capital structure optimization. 
 
Point (v) depends on the fact that the definition of Enterprise Value adopted in our model 
corresponds to an unlevered enterprise value, with no consideration of all the aspects related to the 
capital structure and the cost of debt financing. Also, we have focused only on the value-creation 
components that affect operating assets, so neglecting non-operating assets (e.g. cash and 
marketable securities, holdings in other companies, pension fund assets) which are usually 
considered separately in the transaction processes even when a significant portion of a firm’s value 
derive from them (separate valuation). A consequence of this fact is that care must be taken for the 
choice of the right numerator in the EV/Ebitda ratio: cash not regarding operating activities has to 
be subtracted from the market value of debt and equity.  
 
Once converted both the Enterprise Value and the Synergies into a price, a strategic investor can 
determine the highest price payable for the target’s assets (operating and non-operating) in the 
following way: 
 
 
Enterprise Value extracted through the first regression 
+ Value of synergies extracted through the second regression 
+ Cash and marketable securities 
+ Holdings and other non-operating assets 
+ Value of Tax Shield 
− Debt 
 
   Maximum price to be paid for acquisition of the target firm’s equity 
 
 
 
6. Value drivers and intermediate variables 
 
6.1 Value Drivers 
 
- Acquisition. The portion of capital expenditures represented by the target firm’s prospective 
external investments. This variable has been treated as a qualitative variable. 
 
- Capital Expenditures in R&D (Expenditures in R&D). Research and development expenses 
represent a capital expenditure. To determine the value of capital expenditures in research and 
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development one may use their average value (calculated over the last five years) as a percentage of 
revenues. 
 
- Competitive Rivalry. The pressure determined by the rivalry among competitors inside the 
competitive arena. Due to the difficulties in finding a quantitative expression to the competitive 
rivalry, this variable is considered as a typical qualitative variable. 
 
- Complementarities. We use the term complementarities to identify resources-and-skills 
complementarities and market complementarities, considering the diseconomies derived from any 
kind of overlapping and cannibalization. Even if an acquisition or a merger is viable and it makes 
sense in terms of complementary resources, nevertheless it can fail because of a cultural mismatch 
between the buyer and the target company. So, this variable expresses both the degree of 
complementarity and the degree of potential cultural match between the two enterprises (if the 
cultural match is too difficult to be taken into account, one may rely on the former only). 
 
-Consumer Price Sensitivity (Price Sensitivity). A qualitative variable expressing customers’ price 
sensitivity. It is one of the two determinants of specific risk in our model (the other one is the 
operating leverage). 
 
-Customer Concentration. To measure customer concentration we use the ratio 
 
salestotal
clientper  sales average . 
 
-Economies of Scale. This variable has a qualitative expression in the model (ranging from low to 
high), and represents the economies of scale that Enel is capable of exploit in acquiring Camuzzi. 
Like Complementarities this variable takes on a subjective meaning and depends on the unique 
match between Enel and Camuzzi. 
 
-Entry Barriers. The entry barriers which prevent potential competitors from entering the business. 
It is a qualitative variable. 
 
-Investment in Non Cash Working Capital (NonCash Working Capital). The third variable 
affecting the reinvestment needs is noncash working capital. Short term investments in inventories 
and accounts receivable represent a negative cash flow like any other long term investment in plant 
and equipment. As for the ranges of the linguistic attributes, they depend on the industry 
considered. We have considered the value of the last fiscal year of the firm’s ratio 
NonCashWC/Revenues, compared to the industry average of the same ratio calculated on the same 
year. 
 
-Management Quality. The quality of management affects strategic risk and depends on the 
experience of the firm’s management. It is a qualitative variable ranging from zero (low) to one 
(high) with 0.5 being considered a medium value. 
 
-Market Share. To determine the market power of the combined entity we have used Camuzzi’s 
market share on the Italian Gas market at the time of the transaction. The reference to the Italian 
market – and not to the European one – depends principally from the fact that increasing power on 
the national market was one of the most important goals of the acquisition.       
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-Net Capital Expenditures (Capital Expenditures). It is one of the three determinants of the 
intermediate variable Reinvestment needs and includes the fair adjustments for the capitalizations of 
R&D and of SG&A (selling, general and administrative expenses), net of depreciations and 
amortizations. In order to grant more transparency to the model we do not include here the 
acquisitions (the latter are considered as a different value driver). The ranges of the linguistic 
attributes of this variable depend on the peculiarities of the different industries. To determine them, 
one can use the average (e.g. last three fiscal years) of the firm’s ratio NetCapExp/Revenues 
compared to the industry average of the last year.  
 
-Operating Leverage. The operating leverage expresses the costs’ structure of the firm: the 
proportion of fixed costs on total costs (fixed+variable). It is a significant driver of specific risk, 
because a high operating leverage (high proportion of fixed costs) magnifies the effect of sales 
fluctuations on profit. An average over the last three fiscal years of this ratio can be used to express 
this variable. The ranges of the linguistic attributes of this driver (as those of all non-qualitative 
variables in the model) can be easily defined through a statistical calculation of the distribution of 
values around the industry average. 
 
-Processes Efficiency. The current efficiency of Camuzzi’s processes. This is a qualitative variable 
in the model, even though in some specific industry it is actually possible to find a quantitative 
measure identifying efficiency. Even if an acquisition is under examination and the processes 
efficiency of the target firm can be improved by the buyer, the potential improvement should not be 
included in the definition of this variable. This potential improvement is already considered in the 
model: investment in R&D (which affects product quality) and economies of scales (a determinant 
of synergies) are two examples of potential future improvement in efficiency. 
 
-Reinvestment Rate. The reinvestment rate is defined as 
 
 
capital expenditures − depreciation + ∆ noncash working capital. 
EBIT*(1 − tax rate) 
 
An average on the last five years can be used, if representative of a forward-looking perspective. 
Again, the numerical intervals for the attributes of this variable can be defined through a statistical 
calculation of the distribution of values around the industry average. 
 
-Resources and Skills. Resources and skill owned by Camuzzi. This variable has a double 
correlation in the tree: it is one of the two determinants of the product quality and it is one of the 
three determinants of the strategic risk. It is a qualitative variable.  
 
-Return on Investment (ROI). The return on investment is equal to the ratio 
 
invested capital
rate)tax (1*EBIT − . 
 
Its value should be fixed in a forward-looking perspective (the geometric average in recent years 
may be meaningful). 
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-Sensitivity to Macroeconomic Variables (Sensitivity to Economy). To express the sensitivity to 
macroeconomic factors that affect the business risk, we have considered relevant the unlevered beta 
of the industry.  
 
-Supplier Concentration. To express the supplier concentration one may use the ratio 
 
purchases materials' raw ofcost  total
supplierper  materials raw ofcost  purchase average . 
 
-Tax Rate. The marginal corporate tax rate. 
 
-Technology. The quality and degree of technology owned by Camuzzi. We have considered 
technology as a qualitative variable, even if in some cases and in some specific sector, some 
alternative measure may be used (e.g. value of patents recorded among the intangible assets). 
 
6.2 Intermediate variables 
 
- Bargaining Power. This variable identifies the bargaining power of the target firm towards 
customers  
and suppliers and depends on two input variables: Customer Concentration and Supplier 
Concentration. 
 
- Business Risk.. It identifies the risk of the industry in which Camuzzi operates. It is one of the 
three determinants of operating risk and depends on Competitive Rivalry and Sensitivity to 
Economy. 
 
- Free Cash Flow to Firm (FCFF). By Free Cash Flow to Firm we mean the cash flows available 
to shareholders assuming that the firm is unlevered.12 This variable is one of the three determinants 
of Enterprise Value and, in turn, depends on three drivers: two intermediate variables (the operating 
margin, i.e. EBIT, and the reinvestment needs), and one input variable (the tax rate).  
 
- Growth Rate. The growth rate must be an expected growth rate (forward-looking perspective). In 
our model it depends on two input variables: Reinvestment Rate and ROI.  
 
- Operating Costs. In our model the magnitude of the operating costs depends on Processes 
Efficiency and on an intermediate variable expressing the bargaining power towards suppliers and 
clients. 
 
- Operating Margin. The operating margin results from a composition of three variables: 
Operating Costs, Revenues and Entry Barriers. 
 
- Operating Risk. We have assumed the point of view of a shareholder without a diversified 
portfolio, thus considering the whole operating risk (not only the systematic component). We 
therefore isolate three different determinants for the operating risk: strategic risk, business risk and 
specific risk. Instead of using the standard deviation of the operating returns as a measure of the 
                                                 
12 In general, FCFF=EBIT(1−tax rate)− ∆ working capital requirements − ∆ Net Fixed Assets+ Debt. However, the 
notion we here employ excludes excess cash and marketable securities, as well as other non-core businesses. See 
Ruback (2002) and Fernández (2002) for relation with the notion of Capital Cash Flow. 
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total operating risk, we opt for the definition of some more accurate variables which could 
specifically identify the three risk determinants. Even though the use of a single statistical variable 
could simplify the model, we believe that a finer decomposition of risk drivers helps to get to a 
meticulous and faultless valuation. In order to stress the most specific risk determinants of the firm, 
in the operating risk’s rule block we give a higher weight to the strategic and specific risk than to 
the business risk. Of course the flexibility of the system enables one to change and adapt the model 
to the specific case at hand (for example assuming the point of view of a diversified investor and 
therefore considering only the systematic component of risk). 
 
- Product Quality. The three determinants of the target firm’s product quality are: Expenditures in 
R&D, Resources and Skills, Technology. These inputs, all positively correlated with Product 
Quality, have been given the same relative importance (same weight). 
 
- Reinvestment Needs. In order to grant the model the greatest transparency we distinguish 
investments in acquisitions from capital expenditures in PPE (Property, Plant and Equipment). 
Consequently the reinvestment needs depend on three determinants: Net Capital Expenditures, 
Acquisition and NonCash Working Capital, all in a forward-looking perspective. 
 
- Revenues. Product Quality and Bargaining Power are the antecedents of the intermediate variable 
Revenues. 
 
- Specific Risk. In our model the specific risk depends on two decisive factors of the firm: 
Operating Leverage and Price Sensitivity. 
 
- Strategic Risk. The strategic risk depends on three antecedents: Resources and Skills, Technology 
(these two input variables affect Product Quality as well) and Management Quality. 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
 This paper presents a fuzzy expert system aimed at rating firms. The system takes account of 
financial, managerial, strategic factors, either qualitative or quantitative. We have considered 
twenty-one inputs (value drivers), which are fuzzified and aggregated in several groups through “if-
then” rule blocks in order to obtain intermediate variables. The intermediate variables are in turn 
combined in groups so as to give rise to other intermediate variables, and so on until two 
intermediate outputs are reached: Synergies and Enterprise Value (unlevered, stand-alone, status-
quo, core-business). These intermediate outputs are aggregated to give rise to the Strategic 
Enterprise Value, which is defuzzified so as to provide the evaluator with a score in the interval 
[0,1], which represents the value-creation power of the firm. 
 For explanatory purposes, we have focused on a real-life case of Camuzzi a natural gas 
distributor, recently acquired by Enel, Italian ex monopolist of electric energy. However, the model 
serves various purposes: especially, it may be fruitfully employed for ranking firms operating in the 
same sector. Such a ranking may be used for public information and for establishing consistent 
market values: the higher the rank the higher the market value of the firm. Furthermore, the model 
may be used as a tool for assessing the value of managers’ decisions (and therefore as a basis for 
compensation) or for comparing business units. A price may actually be extracted from the 
normalized rating of the firm; in this case, a considerable amount of data should be available and 
some regression analysis should be conducted to establish a function connecting a defuzzifed 
Enterprise Value with a market value (analogously for extracting the synergy premium). To this 
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end, care must be taken to the notion of value employed and explicit consideration should be taken 
of the value of control, the value of synergies, and the value of the tax shield, in order to avoid 
overcalculation. 
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